Insights from the 2026 SNSI Security Summit

What academic library and IT security teams can learn from each other

By Rick Anderson

I used to think I was unphishable. Then I joined Brigham Young University. In my first couple of years, I was caught three times by phishing tests sent out by our own IT team. It was a humbling lesson: nobody is immune – including librarians who think they can recognize a phishing attempt from a mile away.

 That experience was on my mind when I chaired this year’s SNSI Security Summit, “Ask the CISO: Navigating Security, Access, and Collaboration in Academic Libraries”, hosted by Choice. I was joined by three Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs): Joe Bazeley of Fairfield University, Leo Nelson of Villanova University, and David Sherry, formerly of Brown and Princeton and now with Moran Technology Consulting.

 The themes that stood out for me were organizational culture, shared values, and the growing impact of AI.

Organizational culture: build the relationship before you need it

All three panellists agreed that library and IT security teams need to build strong and open relationships early on, before something goes wrong. Informal and open communication leads to mutual respect and lays the groundwork for more regular, formal meetings – and creates open channels for urgent communication when crises arise, which they inevitably will.

Joe noted: “The formal side is when you start finding vulnerabilities on servers, when you get notices from publishers – that's when you sort of have to make the relationship formal.” He's absolutely right, and it's also true that the informal relationship should begin long before the crisis (whether major or minor). David described a penetration test at Princeton in which the testers got into the university network through a library device. He used this example to show why the partnership needed to be firmly established in advance.

 Speed of response is another essential element of preparation. Joe recalled an instance in which a publisher alerted a library to bulk downloading from a campus IP address. But this was an institution where network logs were retained for only three days – if the breach message had had to pass through several layers of management first, the evidence would be gone before action could be taken. The lesson here is that silos slow things down and can distort the message. Key people in the library and the security team need to know and trust each other, and have each other on speed-dial both figuratively and literally.

 This points to another key point: when it comes to preparing for and dealing with cyberattacks or user misbehaviour, institutional culture can matter as much as structure. David described everyone who uses a computer on campus as “a guardian at the gate” – the last line of defence. But end users can only function that way if people are able to report mistakes without fear. Leo made a related point: someone who deletes a phishing email protects themself, but someone who reports the phishing attempt protects their whole team, and potentially the whole institution. And a no-blame policy only works if IT staff respond to questions with patience, not an eye roll. (Punishment can be informal and cultural as well as formal and institutional.)

 Relationships also need to outlast individuals. Joe noted that the average CISO stays in post for about four years. A library-CISO partnership built only on vague goodwill will not survive that turnover. It needs to be built on both structure and regular, productive communication: shared committees, agreed processes, and regular meetings. As David put it, “relationships are currency on a college campus”.

 Joe and David did not see the library as a primary target of cybercriminals. Most attackers want money, and if they attack the library, it's more likely to be because the library is a conduit to institutional resources they can monetize, rather than to licensed resources or library-specific data. The bigger risks are unpatched in-house systems and shared credentials. Handing a login to a pirate site shares access to everything those credentials can reach. Unfortunately, cybercriminals have learned that they can often gain access to network credentials by targeting library users – or even library employees.

 

Shared values: librarians already speak the language of security

As Joe said, librarians and campus security staff “actually both want the same thing, just [through] slightly different lenses”. He suggested that IT security and library staff collaborate on campus presentations, since “a library presentation on privacy isn't that different than a CISO presentation on privacy”.

He went on to explain how the ‘CIA triad’ of confidentiality, integrity, and availability underpins library thinking as much as security thinking: libraries restrict e-resources to authorized users and protect patron records and depend on data being trustworthy. And they want resources to be available whenever users need them, from wherever the user happens to be physically located. For librarians, as for IT security officers, preserving access for the institution is dependent on maintaining network security and data integrity.

 This shared ground matters in practice as well as in theory. David noted that he always includes a library representative on his security governance committees.

 

AI and cybersecurity: higher stakes, same principles

Leo described three questions we should ask of any AI agent: First, what data can it access? Second, can it receive instructions from outside? And third, can it act on its own (for example by sending emails or deleting files)?

 Joe warned that within the next one to three years, AI tools will massively expand the capabilities of low-skilled attackers. Regarding privacy and data security, though, he saw familiar problems moving faster – becoming what he called “a race car version of a Ford Escort”. With regard to contracts, he suggested that the key question is “Will the data be used to train the model?”

 This took me back to the late 1990s, when I was working in library acquisitions as journal publishing was beginning to move decisively out of print and into the online environment. Librarians and publishers alike found themselves needing to negotiate licence agreements for the first time, and it took time to build a culture of meaningful and effective negotiation. With AI, we find ourselves back in that position. David’s advice was practical: if your library is not part of your campus third-party risk management process, find a way to join it.

 In our closing poll, 96% of respondents said they felt more informed about cybersecurity issues, and 76% said they were more likely to work with their IT counterparts. Library and IT security teams have a lot in common, and a shared goal: supporting the missions of our institutions. My thanks to Leo, David, and Joe for sharing their expertise. You can watch our full discussion on Choice360.

This post was developed with editorial support from SNSI.

About the author

Rick Anderson is University Librarian at the Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University. He is one of the ‘Chefs’ of The Scholarly Kitchen, the official blog of the Society for Scholarly Publishing (SSP), and a past president of both SSP and NASIG (the North American Serials Interest Group). With more than 30 years of experience in academic libraries, he speaks frequently on a wide range of topics, especially scholarly communication.

Next
Next

New federated access initiative for library e-resources builds on work by SNSI and partners